We propose a design for philanthropic or publicly-funded seeding to allow (near) optimal provision of a decentralized, self-organizing ecosystem of public goods. The concept extends ideas from Quadratic Voting to a funding mechanism for endogenous community formation. Individuals make public goods contributions to projects of value to them. The amount received by the project is (proportional to) the square of the sum of the square roots of contributions received. Under the "standard model" this yields rst best public goods provision. Variations can limit the cost, help protect against collusion and aid coordination. We discuss applications to campaign nance, open source software ecosystems, news media nance and urban public projects. More broadly, we o fer a resolution to the classic liberal-communitarian debate in political philosophy by providing neutral and non-authoritarian rules that nonetheless support collective organization. §1 Introduction In many contexts, a sponsor with capital wishes to stimulate and support the creation of public goods but is ill-informed about the appropriate goods to create. Thus, such a sponsor may want to delegate this allocation to a decentralized market process. Examples of these contexts include campaign nance, funding open source software (such as blockchain communities, public or charitable support for news media and the funding of intraurban public projects). Recent work on the theory of Quadratic Voting (henceforth QV; see Posner and Weyl, 2017 for a survey) suggests that near-optimal collective decisionmaking may be feasible in practice, but relies on an assumption of a xed set of communities and public goods that is inappropriate to this context. In this paper we propose an extension of the logic of QV to this setting.
§1 Introduction
In many contexts, a sponsor with capital wishes to stimulate and support the creation of public goods but is ill-informed about the appropriate goods to create. Thus, such a sponsor may want to delegate this allocation to a decentralized market process. Examples of these contexts include campaign nance, funding open source software (such as blockchain communities, public or charitable support for news media and the funding of intraurban public projects). Recent work on the theory of Quadratic Voting (henceforth QV; see Posner and Weyl, 2017 for a survey) suggests that near-optimal collective decisionmaking may be feasible in practice, but relies on an assumption of a xed set of communities and public goods that is inappropriate to this context. In this paper we propose an extension of the logic of QV to this setting.
The basic problem we address can be seen by comparing two extreme ways of funding such a ecosystem, both of which are problematic. On the one hand, a simple private contributory system famously leads to the under-provision of public goods that bene t many people because of the free-rider problem (Samuelson, 1954) . The larger is the number of people the bene t is split amongst, the greater is the proportional under-provision. Conversely, a system based purely on membership or on some other one-person-one-vote (1p1v) system cannot re ect how important various goods are to individuals and will tend to suppress smaller organizations of great value. We aim to create a system that is as exible and responsive as the market, but avoids free-rider problems.
Our solution is to modify the funding principle underlying the market to make it nonlinear. In a standard linear private market, the funding received by a provider is the sum of the contributions made by the funders. In our "Liberal Radical" (LR) mechanism, the funding received by a provider is the square of the sum of the square roots of the contributions made by the funders. Holding xed contribution amounts, funding thus grows with the square of the number of members. However, small contributions are heavily subsidized (as these are the most likely to be distorted by free-riding incentives) while large ones are least subsidized, as these are more like private goods. Under the standard sel sh, independent, private values, quasi-linear utility framework, our mechanism leads to the utilitarian optimal provision of a self-organizing ecosystem of public goods.
While our funding principle may, at rst blush, seem strange or abstruse, existing systems such as matching funds for infrastructure projects, political campaigns, charitable contributions, and other public goods aim to capture similar bene ts, but do so in a haphazard way. For example, a variety of public goods are funded through matching programs, whereby an institutional body (a government, corporation, political party, etc.) matches individual contributions either 1:1 or in some other ratio. For example, New York City matches small contributions to campaigns for elected o ce (city council, mayor, comptroller, public advocate), matching contributions 6:1 and up to $ 175. Many corporations use similar rules: one of our employers matches charitable contributions by all full-time employees up to $ 15,000 a year. Doing so ampli es small contributions, incents more contributions and greater diversity in potential contributors, and confers a greater degree of in uence on individuals in determining ultimate funding allocations.
Matching programs are not only common in public and charitable funding, but also follow an intuitive logic that has built a variety of public policies. Indeed, the very idea of tax deductibility for charitable contributions is a form of governmental matching. But while matching funds share the spirit of our funding principle, they lack a systematic design, and set the funding ratios and maximums in arbitrary ways. The LR mechanism can be seen as o fering a coherent design that captures their central motivation in a mechanism that is (approximately) optimal from the perspective of economic theory.
This paper is written in a manner that is unusual today. It combines formal economic and mathematical logic, detailed practical considerations and extended discussion of the normative political philosophy around our proposals. We do this in a deliberate attempt to revive a lost tradition of political economy. 1 We see formal rules derived from mechanism design, but interpreted through the lens of philosophical 1 Keynes (1924) wrote, The study of economics does not seem to require any specialized gifts of an unusually high order. Is it not, intellectually regarded, a very easy subject compared with the higher branches of philosophy or pure science? An easy subject at which few excel! The paradox finds its explanation, perhaps, in that the master-economist must possess a rare combination of gifts. He must be mathematician, historian, statesman, philosopher-in concerns and designed with an eye towards security and user interface, as o fering radical and yet realistic templates for solutions to large-scale practical problems, as well as novel conceptual possibilities for social and political life.
We understand that this mixture will be disorienting to many of our readers and that not all parts of this paper will be interesting or digestible to each audience we aim to reach. We therefore now provide a roadmap that should help readers determine where to focus their attention.
We begin the paper in §2 by providing more detail on the background and motivation above. This section covers economic theory in a non-mathematical way that should be broadly accessible. We then develop a simple but general mathematical model in §3 of public good provision and use it to illustrate the failures of both the market system (Bergstrom et al., 1986 ) and 1p1v (Bowen, 1943) . We then, in §4, describe LR formally and show mathematically that it leads to optimal public goods provision. We then turn, in §5, to a variety of variations and extensions that enrich the range of applicability and our understanding of LR. These three sections are quite mathematical and are likely to be relevant to those with more formal training.
Having developed this apparatus, we change gears in §6 to describing a range of applications, with attention to special characteristics of each case and how LR, despite its somewhat exotic nature, matches qualitative features of previous solutions while more smoothly covering a wider range of cases and problems. This section is widely accessible and likely to be of most interest to entrepreneurs and policymakers interested in applying the ideas.
We conclude the paper on a more abstract and philosophical note. In §7 we argue that while LR is derived from utilitarian principles, it o fers a compelling synthesis of non-utilitarian liberal and communitarian ideals into a philosophy we call Liberal Radicalism, which gives the title of this piece. We ground this philosophy in the history of liberal ideas and highlight its many precedents. §8 concludes by discussing directions for future research and implications for the future of governance. §2 Background One of the most fundamental problems in political economy is variously known as the "free-rider", "collective action" or "public goods" problem; we will use the term "public goods". All these refer to cases where individuals can or do receive bene ts from shared resources and investments that may be more valuable than the contribution they individually make to those shared resources, which cannot be eciently priced due to the expense or ine ciency involved in excluding individuals from access. While the term public goods is sometimes used by economists to refer to a particularly extreme case, we are interested in a broader set of activities. By "public good" we refer to any activity with increasing returns in the sense that the socially e cient price to charge for the activity (marginal cost) is signi cantly below the average cost of creating the good.
As we illustrate formally in the next section, classical capitalism deals poorly with such activities. Because each individual, if she acts sel shly, only accounts for the bene ts she receives and not the bene ts to all other individuals, funding levels will not scale with the number of individual bene ciaries as would be desirable.
Because public goods are such an omnipresent concern in modern capitalism, a range of institutions have emerged to address this problem. The most canonical and perhaps the important is the contemporary democratic nation state. Such states use taxation and voting-based governance systems to determine how much and which public goods should be provided. The other most prevalent method for addressing public goods is converting them to private goods by imposing technologies (e.g. digital rights management for information or walls and fee collectors at parks) that allow individuals to be excluded. The nal mechanism is using moral, cultural, religious or social motives to induce individuals to contribute to charitable providers of public goods. Some intermediate institutions mix elements of these three ideal types. One example is a local government with some ability to exclude, which citizens can move across at some cost and to which they have some loyalty (and thus often donate their time). Another would be an exclusive but not-for pro t club.
Unfortunately, all of these mechanisms have fairly severe limitations. 1p1v democratic systems (even when they work appropriately) respond to the will of the majority, not necessarily to what would create the greatest overall value. They often oppress minorities or are subverted by minorities to avoid such oppression. They are also extremely costly to set up, rigid and do not easily adapt to demands for di ferent and new levels of organization. Private (usually corporate) exclusion-based e forts are, while more exible, usually cumbersome and costly to impose, often lack e fective feedback mechanisms that ensure they serve the interests of their members and, perhaps most importantly, ine ciently exclude potential users. Charitable organizations often are more responsive and exible than either of the other forms, but rely on motives that seem to be di cult to closely align reliably with the common good and often instead get captured by status motivations and parochial, even exclusionary, interests. Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973) , recasting the insights of Vickrey (1961) , proposed a solution to this problem, in the form of a rather complex mechanism for individuals to reveal their preferences over public goods to a government or other central clearinghouse to overcome the rigidity and ine ciency of majority rule. Unfortunately, this system is extremely fragile to collusion and very risky for participants in a way that most analysts have concluded makes it impractical (Rothkopf, 2007) .
Recently, however, more practical mechanisms have emerged for near-optimal collective decisionmaking. Groves and Ledyard (1977) and Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) both suggested a quadratic mechanism for determining the level of continuous public goods, but their methods require either a centralized iterative process or depend heavily on an unrealistic assumption of complete information. However, the basic insight of quadratic pricing of collective choices reemerged in Weyl (2012)'s proposal for what he called "Quadratic Vote Buying".
In particular, he proposed allowing individuals to buy votes, paying the square of the votes they buy. He argued, and Lalley and Weyl (2018) rigorously proved, that under standard assumptions (similar to those we use below) in large populations this leads to approximately optimal decisions on public goods. A variety of work has extended this idea to arguments for the approximate e ciency of procedures like this, which are broadly called Quadratic Voting (QV), under a range of other settings and shown they may be applied well beyond simple, binary votes. Posner and Weyl (2017) survey this work.
However, while QV addresses the ine ciency of standard 1p1v voting systems for a given set of decisions and collectives, it doesn't solve the problem of exibility. That is, it does not allow the set of public goods to emerge from a society organically, and e fectively assumes a previously-speci ed organizational structure that has to be taken as an assumption or imposed by an authority. In this paper we try to extend the ideas around QV to address this limitation. §3 Model Consider a society of N citizens i = 1, . . . N; we take as an assumption throughout what follows that we can veri ably distinguish among and identify these citizens, though we will discuss the possibility that they may collude (see §5.2 below). We use the term "society" to refer to the set of all participants and the word "community" to refer to groups that fund a particular public good; however, in many applications, the relevant "society" is itself a community within the broader world.
There is a set of potential public goods P , but we do not make any assumption about the nature of this set (there may be some measure theoretic questions for some cardinalities of the set, but we will ignore these). In particular, there is no sense in which the set of public goods need be speci ed externally or in advance; any citizen may at any time propose a new public good. We denote a typical public good p ∈ P .
Let V p i (F p ) be the currency-equivalent utility citizen i receives if the funding level of public good p is F p . We assume all public goods generate independent value to citizens (no interactions across public goods) and that citizens have quasi-linear utility denominated in units of currency. Our interest here is in maximization of dollar-equivalent value rather than achieving an equitable distribution of value (we assume that an equitable distribution of basic resources has been achieved in some other manner, such as an equal initial distribution of resources). For purposes of simplifying the analysis below, we assume all functions V p i are concave, smooth and increasing. Absent these assumptions some complications may arise (as we return to in §5.6) but are su ciently minor and tangential to the main argument that it is easier to abstract from them for the moment.
Each citizen i can make contributions to the funding of each public good p out of her personal resources c p i . The total utility of citizen i is then
where t i is a tax imposed on individual i. In this framework, di ferent funding mechanisms for public goods are di ferent formulae for relating
, with any surplus or de cit being made up for by taxes that do not in uence behavior. Formally, budget balance requires that i t i = p (F p − i c p i ) (taxes make up for any de cit between individual contributions and total funding levels). Before studying such mechanisms, however, we consider what social welfare maximization requires. Our analysis here is the special case of Samuelson's analysis in the case of quasi-linear utility.
Total social welfare is simply
be the total value all individuals derive from the good. Maximizing this over all weakly positive funding levels {F p } p for all goods, given concavity and smoothness of the V functions this is equivalent to F p being 0 if V p ′ (0) ≤ 1 or taking on the unique value satisfying
That is, the total marginal value derived from the good should equal 1. We now consider two suboptimal funding mechanisms. The rst, which we refer to as "Capitalism", has F p = i c p i and t i = 0. This corresponds to the traditional formula used for charitable giving; while there are sometimes public matching funds of a small magnitude, these will not greatly change our conclusions, which closely follow the analysis of Bergstrom et al.. In this case, every citizen i seeks to maximize, in determining her contribution to good p
This requires (di ferentiating) that for any citizen i making a positive contribution to good p that
That is, the level funding must be such that a single citizen's marginal value equals 1. If a large set of citizens bene t signi cantly from a public good, this will typically lead to severe underfunding. For example, if all individuals are homogeneous, this is equivalent to V p ′ = N, or setting the total marginal utility of the good to N times the level it should be at. When citizens have heterogeneous preferences, matters are even worse, at least from a distributive perspective: only the single citizen who cares most on the margin about the good has any in uence on its provision. Matters are even more pessimistic if citizens can make negative contributions (privatize public goods), as then the lowest valuation citizen determines the provision level.
2
Another system, which we will call "(1p1v) democracy", has F p satisfy
and funds the goods entirely through taxes. Clearly this does not lead to optimality, as the mean must be used in the above formula rather than the median to recover V p ′ = 1, as Bowen (1943) observed. Public good funding levels will tend to be higher and probably more accurate than under Capitalism, which is likely why most developed countries use democratic mechanisms for determining levels of public goods. However, clearly the median is often a poor approximation for the mean, especially for goods of value to smaller communities or "entrepreneurial public goods" where a small community has an idea for a public good that is not widely understood at the time for funding. These may well receive no funding from democracy; this is an important reason why most small communities are funded primarily by charity or Capitalism rather than 1p1v.
Some improvements are possible, depending on how the funding mechanisms are adjusted; as Bergstrom (1979a,b) argued, if there is some reasonable proxy for which individuals will bene t most from a good and we can tax them for it, 1p1v democracy may yield reasonable outcomes as everyone will then agree on whether a given good is desirable. But in this begs the question: in this case any consensual mechanism will agree. Our goal is to nd appropriate funding level without assuming such prior centralized knowledge.
First note that the mechanism must take the form
for some functions g and hbecause the mechanism is neutral across citizens and collections of citizens. All must be treated interchangeably as we care only about aggregate welfare. Now let's call
We can then de ne C ≡ h −1 as the cost of influence for citizens. Our goal is to nd a formula where a citizen's in uence is proportional to her marginal value for the public good. This will only occur if the marginal cost of in uence is proportional to the citizen's current in uence, as the citizen will choose in uence at the point where the marginal cost of additional in uence is equal to the marginal bene t of in uence (more of the public good). In particular, she will choose
Given that g ′ is the same for all citizens, this formula will yield
. But C ′ is proportional to its argument only for the quadratic function. Thus, we know that C must be quadratic and thus h the square root function.
While there is a detailed argument for why g must be the square function, the simplest way to think about it is that it is just a matter of units. If h is the square root, but both c and F are in dollars, there must be a square "undoing things" or the mechanism will not be neutral to super cial changes, like denominating the mechanism in a di ferent currency. No additional multiplicative or additive factors turn out to be relevant, as the coe cients thrown o f by the square and the square root cancel each other.
Properties of the Liberal Radical mechanism
This discussion leads us naturally to a consideration of the properties of the LR mechanism. First note that it is homogeneous of degree one, in the sense that if a xed set of citizens are contributing and double their contributions, this doubles the funding. This is a useful and reassuring property, as it implies that, among other things:
• Changing currencies makes no di ference to the mechanism.
• Groups can gain nothing by splitting or combining projects with the same group of participants.
• It matters little precisely how frequently the mechanism is run, whether donations are aggregated at the monthly, daily or yearly level, unless the pattern of donations is temporally uneven in an important way.
Second, consider what happens in the case where every contributing citizen makes an equal contribution, say of one unit as we vary the number of citizens contributing N c . In this case, the funding received is N 2 c . Thus, holding xed the amount of the contribution, the funding received grows as the square of the community size. This is also quite intuitive and reassuring, as we saw above that under Capitalism, there is a factor N c underfunding of goods on the margin. It is thus natural to solve this by multiplying upward funding by the community size.
Third, and following from this point, note that a community that splits in half with roughly similar contribution pro les will receive half the aggregate funding of the total community: both halves will receive one quarter. This is a clear deterrent against fragmentation and atomization, and is the core reason why the LR mechanism can solve the public goods problem. However, this feature does not at all imply that under LR only extremely large communities will form. Di ferent collections of citizens will have di ferent purposes in using their funds, some in smaller and some in larger groups.
The trade-o f between preference heterogeneity and the bene ts of scale is well-known to political economists, for example, from the literature on the optimal size of nations (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997) . LR does not prejudge this optimal size, but unlike Capitalism or 1p1v o fers a mechanism that creates truly neutral incentives among social organization of di ferent sizes. This turns out, however, to require providing much greater funding for a given contribution profile to larger grouping for the obvious collective action reason (see below): each citizen will tend to contribute less, absent this incentive, to larger groupings where she receives a smaller share of relevant bene ts.
Fourth, note that the mechanism reverts to a standard private good in the case that a single citizen attempts to use the mechanism for her own enrichment. In the case where the overwhelming bulk of contributions come from one citizen, other contributions to the sum of square roots approximately drop out and we are left with the square of the square root, which is simply the contribution itself. More broadly, as we go towards goods that are approximately private, the mechanism treats them as approximately private goods.
Fifth, and really just to summarize, the mechanism provides much greater funding to many small contributions than to a few large ones. This is not for any reason of equity or distributive justice, though there may be good reasons from those perspectives to admire the outcome it delivers. It is instead because large communities of citizens each receiving only a small bene t tend to be disadvantaged by Capitalism relative to concentrated interests, a central concern in democratic theory since at leastMadison (1787) and famously associated with Mancur Olson's (1965) Logic of Collective Action.
While some of these properties may open such a system to potential collusion or manipulation, as we will return to in §5.2 below, overall we view them as heartening con rmations that our analysis captures the intuitive core that a solution to the public goods problem should have.
User interface
Precisely what the LR mechanism would "look like" is beyond our scope here, but a brief description of a possibility will hopefully help readers imagine how it might be feasible. Any citizen could at any time propose a new organization to be included in the system. Depending on the context, there might be a more or less extensive process of being approved to be listed in the system by an administrator; this would be especially important for philanthropically-sponsored version with a limited scope, as the philanthropist would not want to fund just any project.
Citizens could contribute their funds towards (or possibly against, see §5.3 below) any listed project at some regular interval, such as monthly. Citizens would be given some (possibly imperfect and delayed, for security purposes) indication of the total funding level of various projects. This would help citizens determine both the amount of funding projects would receive if they contributed a bit extra (likely aided by appropriate visualizations and "calculators") to a particular project and whether a project has enough funding to be successful. This will help avoid projects overly fragmenting: given the far greater funding that a project supported by many can receive than fragmented ones, there would be far less incentive than under Capitalism for a thousand projects to proliferate, and even under present Capitalism some amount of coordination seems to in practice limit such fragmentation.
As we discuss in §5.2 and 5.6 below, various more detailed features of the system would be needed to help ensure security and enable coordination among participants. Furthermore, the precise look and feel of the system requires much more thought and even might a fect the formal rules in some way. None of us are designers so we are far from expert in these questions. We look forward to seeing what speci c designs those more expert in this area come up with.
Incorporating the deficit
Above we assumed that citizens ignore their impact on the de cit for clarity. We will now see what difference eliminating this assumption makes. Suppose that citizen i has a shadow value of λ i on reducing the budget de cit; we can think of this as the fraction of the de cit that will be funded by taxing her or, as we will explore in §5.1 below, the cost to her of reduced funding of other public goods a greater de cit will require. The aggregate cost of an increased de cit is then Λ ≡ i λ i , which may be greater or less than 1, but we assume it is roughly on that order of magnitude and that each λ i is on the order of 1 N , so that in a large society no citizen is nancing a large share of the de cit.
In this case, citizen i seeks to maximize in her contributions to project p
The associated rst-order condition for maximization is
Aggregating this across all citizens yields
where the approximation follows from the fact that λ i is of order 1 N , so that in a large population the denominator in the square root sum ratio is much larger than the numerator.
This suggests that once we account for the de cit, the LR mechanism does not yield efficiency. Instead it yields underfunding of all public goods by a ratio of 1+Λ. How to interpret this conclusion is somewhat subtle, however, and is something we return to extensively below. For the most part and in most cases, we believe this does not fundamentally change our conclusions. We now brie y run through some of these cases:
1. First consider the case, likely common, in which most of the goods funded by the mechanism only bene t a relatively small fraction of the community. In this case, there is little or no problem, because our analysis relies on negative contributions being made by all of the citizens that do not bene t (the left-hand side of the rst-order condition is negative). So long as these are disallowed (as above), this will drop out most contributions towards Λ and we will obtain a conclusion very close to the one based on entirely ignoring the nancing considerations. See §5.3 below for more details.
2. In some cases, we may want to allow for negative contributions because certain "goods" are public "bads" for some, such as nancing hate speech. Allowing such "shorting" may be undesirable in some cases, as we discuss in §5.3 below, but assuming we do want to allow it does not immediately ruin everything. In the natural case when some non-wasteful tax is used to fund the de cit, Λ = 1. In this case, LR will just lead to V p ′ = 2, which is underfunding of public goods, but not very severe underfunding and in a manner that is neutral across di ferent goods and thus approximately optimal (see §5.1 below). This logic also applies to goods that are consumed by a large part of the population: they will be somewhat underfunded, but not severely. Furthermore, even this modestly pessimistic conclusion disappears in the case of goods consumed by a small part of the population if we believe most citizens will not be bothered to make tiny negative contributions to goods they do not bene t from. Finally, it can be overcome entirely by reducing the cost of contributions to be proportionally smaller than the amount they in uence outcomes. 3. As we will see in §5.1 below, when there is an external philanthropist funding the subsidies in the mechanism rather than a tax on the community, these issues essentially disappear. There will be some underfunding, but this is determined by the constraints of the philanthropist and not by this nancing quirk in the mechanism.
In short, while considering incentives to a fect de cits creates some complications and potential deviations from perfect optimality, the impact is small and often irrelevant. Therefore, we omitted it from our analysis above. §5 Variations and Extensions
The above sketch leaves many open questions in many applications. In this section we try to address some of the most important outstanding questions.
Budgeted matching funds
In many practical applications, at least in the near-term, the funding for LR is likely to come from philanthropists or some dedicated government appropriation rather than from unlimited tax revenue. An advantage of such philanthropic (or dedicated government) funding is that, if most of the participants do not personally care about the philanthropist's wealth, it eliminates the issues of nancing and worries about de cits in §4.5 above.
Consider the rule
That is, an α mixture of LR with a 1 − α weight on Capitalism. We call this the Capital-constrained Liberal Radical (CLR) mechanism. The rst thing to note about it is that for any budget B, α may be adjusted to ensure the budget is not exceeded. To see this, note that when α → 0 the mechanism is both directly self-nancing and, indirectly, the amount invested in the public good falls for the reasons we have discussed above. Thus, all de cit can be eliminated by setting α low enough. This ensures that a philanthropist can reliably set a low level of α and perhaps gradually increase it over time to increase support.
Second, note that no one would ever choose to contribute outside this system (no one's contributions through it are taxed). To see this note that
The factor multiplying α is by construction always at least 1, so this always exceeds unity, the marginal impact of a contribution made through a separate, capitalist channel. This implies that CLR is consistent with existing within a broader capitalist society, not just in terms of funding but also in terms of getting people to "play ball" with the mechanism (what economists call "individual rationality").
Third, consider equilibrium incentives under CLR. In choosing her contribution to good p, citizen i maximizes
with associated rst-order condition
The approximation here is based on the population funding the good being large relative to any individual, as will be the case for a genuinely public good; for goods supplied to very small communities or individuals, funding will be greater than implied by this approximation, but this extra funding will mostly come through the private channel and not be subsidized by the philanthropist and thus should not be of great concern to her (it would occur through Capitalism in any case). Thus, the CLR mechanism will lead to underfunding of the good by a factor of 1 α as compared to the (rough) underfunding under Capitalism by a factor of the typical size of the bene ting community. Assuming setting, we consider the planner's problem which is the same as in the baseline set up, but with a new interpretation of the budget constraint. The planner seeks to maximize i V i (F p ) subject to the budget constraint which is simply p F p = B. Solving the constrained maximization problem,
gives us the result that that V p ′ = λ, i.e. V p ′ is a constant and thus our above result that V p ′ = 1 α suggests that CLR funding is optimally allocated across goods if α is chosen to just exhaust the budget.
Of course, this ignores the fact that funding di ferent goods di ferentially may help stimulate more private contributions, and the fact that CLR does not quite achieve
as there are also some contributions through the e fective Capitalist channel. Atkinson and Stiglitz's analysis is much more careful on these points and gives (fairly speci c) conditions under which equal distortion ratios are nonetheless optimal. Verifying conditions, considering all this, when CLR is exactly optimal is an interesting direction for future research, but beyond our scope here.
Some of the underfunding implied by CLR may not be entirely undesirable, as it may balance underinvestment in private goods creation created by the distortionary taxes that will often be necessary to fund the mechanism (see §5.5 below) and, as we now discuss, deter collusion.
Collusion and deterrence
The central vulnerabilities of LR, as with other mechanisms designed based on the assumption of unilateral optimization, ared collusion and fraud. Collusion takes place when multiple agents act in their mutual interest to the detriment of other participants. Fraud takes place when a single citizen misrepresents herself as many.
Before we turn to potential solutions, it is useful to spell out precisely what these threats are and the harms they could bring to LR or CLR. Consider, for concreteness, a case of CLR with α = .1. First suppose one citizen is able to misrepresent herself fraudulently as 20. If she contributes x dollars in the capacity of each of these citizens, she will pay 20x but her cause (which could just deposit to her bank account) will receive
Thus, on net, she doubles her money. This is a sure arbitrage opportunity and could easily convert LR into a means to just line the pockets of the fraudster. The minimum fraud size required to run this racket at positive pro t is 1 α . A perfectly colluding group of citizens could achieve something similar. The colluding group may all be participants in the mechanism, or they may be partially formed of participants in the mechanism together with one or more outside observers with an interest in the mechanism's outcome. Collusion can either happen "horizontally", between multiple participants with similar goals, or "vertically", between one or more participants in the mechanism and an outside participant (or a participant in a di ferent side of the mechanism, eg. a potential recipient of a subsidy) that can o fer conditional payments (ie. bribes) to induce the participants to behave in particular ways. Again, if the size of this group is greater than 1 α and the group can perfectly coordinate, there is no limit (other than the budget) to how much it can steal.
However, note that unilateral incentives run quite strongly against this. Consider a colluding group with 100 members each investing $ 1000, which is thus funded at a level of .1 · 100 2 · 1000 =$ 1,000,000. If this cartel divided the spoils equally among its members, the group members would each receive $ 10,000 and thus achieve a net bene t of $ 9000. Now consider what happens if one member decides to defect and contribute nothing. The funding level is now 99 2 · 100 =$ 980,100. Thus, the defecting member would see her pay out fall to $ 9801, but would have saved $ 1000 and thus on net would now be making $ 801 more than she was before. There is thus very little incentive for any member of the cartel to actually participate. Unless activity can be carefully monitored and actual payment levels directly punished, defection is likely to be very attractive and the cartel is likely to die the death of a thousand cuts. Simply sharing revenue with participants is not close to being su cient to sustain collusion.
There is a broader point here. If perfect harmonization of interests is possible, Capitalism leads to optimal outcomes. LR is intended to overcome such lack of harmonization and falls prey to manipulation when it wrongly assumes harmonization is di cult. This is a bit of a paradox: while LR seeks to foster community direction through its design, in doing so it relies on strong ties of community owing outside the design not existing.
The appropriate way of deterring fraud and collusion will depend on the a fordances of the system. First consider fraud, which is the simpler and more devastating of the issues. If fraud cannot be reasonably controlled, LR simply cannot get o f the ground; it will immediately become a money pump for the rst fraudster to come along. Note, however, that this is true of nearly any system with a democratic avor: 1p1v can easily be exploited through fraud. The simplest and most clearly necessary solution to fraud is an e fective system of identity veri cation. Beyond this, relatively small groups giving large contributions and thus receiving large funding should be audited when possible to determine if fraud has occurred and large penalties (much larger than the scale of the fraud, to adjust for the chance of detection) should be imposed on the fraudsters and transferred to other, honest citizens.
Collusion is a subtler and more pernicious problem to root out, and perhaps the greatest challenge for LR, given the tension between community building and collusion deterrence. In all cases, a modest value of α and auditing of small, highly funded groups will help deter tight collusive groups and perhaps mostly take care of that problem. Yet the best approach to deterring broader collusion will depend on the nature of the setting: a case in which citizens are friendly and all know each other, as in a small town, will di fer from the case in which participants have low trust for each other and are highly diverse, as in a blockchain community. We begin by considering this later case and then return to the former.
In a broad-society context, the possibility of collusion can be mitigated technologically. It has for a long time been understood in the voting systems literature that mitigating vote buying requires a strong privacy property known as coercion resistance: not only are votes private, but a voter cannot prove to anyone else who they voted for (or even, ideally, whether or not they voted) even if they wanted to. It may seem paradoxical that we can improve outcomes in a democracy by reducing participants' powers in this way, but such paradoxes arise naturally in tragedy of the commons scenarios: a participant gains the full bene t from some action (in this case, selling their vote) but only pays a small fraction of the cost (in this case, the cost imposed to the entire community by a candidate that everyone privately agrees is suboptimal winning the election because everyone sold their vote).
The lowest-tech solution, and one perhaps even worth considering, is a literal in-person voting station. In these stations, anyone can come in with some quantity of cash, and privately distribute the cash between di ferent bins corresponding to di ferent projects. Individuals would put their contributions into an envelope before putting it into a bin, so that the size of the contribution could be inferred upon counting. The anonymized vote can then be calculated, with each voting station returning only the sum of square roots of contributions, and not the amounts made by any individual contributor. There could be one nal bin in the voting station that does not correspond to any project, where participants can deposit money that would be simply mailed back to them; this ensures that even the total amount that a participant spends on contributions would be hidden.
This process would be ine cient, but the coercion resistance property (the inability to prove what one contributed to or how much one contributed) would be satis ed in a way that regular people could understand and see why it holds. That said, the vision of expanding LR-based tools to many more spheres of life, and not just highly infrequent elections, requires more e ciency than o ine voting booths can practically accomplish, and so a fully electronic alternative would be best. It would also be challenging to make such a low-tech solution fully dynamic in the way that allows for the best possible coordination as we discuss in §5.6 below.
Electronic voting systems that can achieve coercion resistance have been developed (Juels et al., 2010) , and similar work has been extended to the setting of quadratic voting (Park and Rivest, 2017) . These schemes typically rely on cryptographic schemes called multi-party computation and an assumption that you can trust some fraction of citizens. They allow voters to generate some form of fake keys or fake votes that an attacker cannot tell apart from the real thing, but the voting mechanism can. However, these schemes inevitably have a vulnerability at setup time: if an attacker can bribe certain participants to give their keys to the attacker before the process even starts, the attacker can then use the keys to vote for the attacker's desired candidate. Even if the attacker only "wins the race" 50 of the time, this still gives the attacker a large in uence.
Hence, Juels et al. make a trust assumption. In their words: 
We make the assumption that the registration phase proceeds without a corruption of voters. This assumption is at some level a requirement for a coercion-free election, as an attacker capable of corrupting and seizing the credentials of a voter in this initial

Voters become aware of the identity of any corrupted player in R.
A further kind of attack can take place using trusted hardware such as SGX (Software Guard Extension). An attacker can bribe voters to generate their keys in an SGX enclave, and use a signature from the enclave to prove that they have done so. This enclave would run code that only allows them to make messages that correspond to votes for the attacker's preferred cause, and does not allow them to use decoy votes or keys (except with the attacker's permission). This property--the ability to prove that one holds a cryptographic key encumbered so that it can be used for some purposes and not others-is unique to trusted hardware. Further, it presents an opportunity for attack against all supposed coercion resistant voting schemes.
This possibility can be mitigated by a hypothetical cryptographic primitive that represents a "proof of not being inside trusted hardware", for example some computation that due to memory requirements can be done in traditional hardware but not chips of more limited capacity. Another approach is that proposed by Juels et al. themselves: an authority issues private keys that are themselves inside trusted hardware (as they describe it, a smart card), thereby proving that they are not inside other trusted hardware that has a malevolent use. The smart card may have functionality that outputs the key and immediately replaces the key stored in the card with a decoy key, allowing any user, immediately upon receipt of the card, to ask for this key and store it in some secret location. Adversaries looking to buy the user's votes, even if they do so by buying the smart card, would not be able to tell that the decoy key now stored in the card is illegitimate, but the voting mechanism, which uses multiparty computation to ensure that it is not vulnerable to any single party, would be able to, and would reject the votes and accept the original voter's votes.
In general, these techniques can be carried over to the LR setting. The main novel di culty presented by the LR setting is in revealing the total amount that a user spends on contributions so that their balance can be subtracted, and allowing the user to perform an operation that consists of "sending money to themselves" inside the mechanism. If this issue is not su ciently dealt with, users could pretend they contributed a larger amount than they contributed.
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The multiparty computation could, in addition to calculating the square of the sum of square roots of contributions, also calculate the sum of the contributions, plus a "decoy amount", from that participant. It would also ask each participant for a "decoy refund address." The computation would hold a private key to a fully privacy-preserving payment system, such as Zcash, and it would generate transactions that refund the participant their decoy amount and publish them. The computation would also publish the total contributions plus decoy for each participant, so that these amounts can be subtracted from the participant's account.
Other potential schemes for large-scale, relatively low-trust environments are more speculative, but could hold some bene ts based on exploiting and undermining trust required to operate a collusive scheme. For example, enforcers (either human or bots) operating on behalf of the system might impersonate voters seeking to receive bribes; those o fering bribes could them be penalized (though their cause should not be, as this would open the scheme to attacks by those seeking to defund a good). If coercion resistance could be achieved, such decoys could be useful even without punishment as the simple act of o fering to accept a bribe and then betraying the briber's trust would undermine collusion. Decoys could also impersonate bribers and penalize those accepting the bribes or fail to follow through on the bribe paying. Amnesties or even rewards could be o fered for those who o fer evidence proving collusion is going on and could be nanced by nes on those engaging in the collusion. Many schemes like this are presently used to reasonable e fect in law enforcement and can be scaled up and improved by thoughtful mechanism design, an interesting direction for future research.
In smaller groups where mutual knowledge and trust are much higher, many of these approaches will be less e fective. LR may in any case by less useful and less widely used in those contexts, as social norms may be enough to ensure reasonable public good provision. But where this is not the case, it would be important to develop a cultural commitment that collusion by sub-groups constitutes cheating, just as stealing common resources would constitute cheating. More generally, in cases between small and large societies, some combination of norms/community enforcement with the formal schemes we describe above may su ce to address the problems posed by collusion. But, being the largest threat to LR's e fective operation, only experimentation will tell both how serious these problems are and how they can most e fectively be overcome.
Negative contributions
Not all public projects bring bene ts alone; some may harm certain citizens by creating negative externalities such as pollution or o fense such as hate speech. This does not immediately imply we should allow negative contributions to re ect these harms: some of these negative externalities can be addressed directly through legislation, there are some dangers of allowing citizens to defund projects they don't like and allowing negative contributions opens some tricky issues as we discussed in §4.5 above. However, in some cases the bene ts of allowing the expression of negative externalities will outweigh these concerns and thus negative contributions will be desirable.
The natural extension of LR to allow this is that citizens may choose to defund a public good according to the same cost structure. That is,
where ± i is positive or negative at the discretion of citizen i. Citizens with V p ′ i ≥ 0 or λ i in the cases where they account for their budget impact will choose the positive sign; those with the opposite will choose the negative sign.
We already know the rst-order condition for positive contributors; let's consider it for negative contributors (for simplicity we focus on the de cit-ignoring, fully nanced case):
Note that together with the rst-order condition for those making positive contributions this can be summarized as
and thus aggregates up to
as is optimal. This is the sense in which allowing negative contributions is desirable: without allowing them, there may be negative externalities of a project that are not internalized into its funding. However, as noted in §4.5 above, it is principally allowing negative contributions that leads to underfunding if citizens consider their impact on the de cit, though as noted in the previous subsection, some underfunding of this sort may actually be useful to deter collusion. More broadly, negative contributions may be a quite powerful way to deter collusive schemes as they o fer a way for any citizen to be a "vigilante enforcer" against fraud and abuse. The downside of this bene t, however, is obviously that, in some cases, absolute free speech and other protections may lead us to distrust such vigilantism.
In short, there are a variety of costs and bene ts to allowing negative contributions and we suspect their desirability will vary across contexts.
Variations on functional form
One might naturally wonder if the functional form we propose is uniquely optimal. We believe that it is, up to some quirks. 6 We leave a formal proof for future work, but instead here illustrate the point by considering a class of rules that nests both LR and Capitalism, illustrating a spectrum of potential solutions.
Consider rules
Again, we analyze this abstracting from de cits and incentives created by these. To avoid redundancy, we skip straight to citizen i's rst-order condition:
A convenient property of this form is that for β > 1, unlike for the exactly β = 1 case, every citizen with strictly positive V p ′ i will make at least a tiny contribution. Note that as β → 1 however, this rule approaches Capitalism, while when β → 2 this becomes LR.
Away from these now-familiar cases, it is useful to consider what happens for β ∈ (1, 2) and β ∈ (2, ∞). Note that our reasoning above implies that V p ′ is in all these cases equated to something of the
,
Whether this ratio is greater than or less than one is determined by Jensen's inequality, which states that the sum of a function applied to numbers is greater (less) than the function applied to the sum if the function is convex (concave). That is, public goods will be over (under) funded if the function x β−1 is convex (concave). Given that β = 2 leads to e ciency and β = 1 leads to the severe underfunding of Capitalism, this should not be too surprising.
This might lead one to wonder, might not β ∈ (1, 2) be a superior interpolation between Capitalism and LR compared to our CLR mechanism in §5.1 above? While, as we discuss shortly, this may be a reasonable idea to experiment with, theory indicates it is an inferior solution. To see why, note that β ∈ (1, 2) does not simply lead to underfunding, but to differential underfunding of projects with many small contributors. To see this note that we can rewrite citizen i's rst-order condition as
Thus the e ciency condition that the aggregate marginal utility equals one obtains except that the transformation x 1 β−1 is applied to it. For β < 2 this is a convex transformation, which will thus exaggerate 6 As Eguia and Xefteris (2018) show, in a su ciently large population (holding xed value distributions, any function with a zero rst derivative and positive second derivative will behave like QV; this idea should extend to our present context. We think this is not very meaningful, however, as the appropriate limit is often one where value distributions also change as the population grows, so that behavior of the function away from zero also matters. large marginal utilities and dampen small ones; it thus systematically leads to the underfunding of goods with many small bene ciaries and over-funding of goods with a few large bene ciaries.
This seems quite problematic not just from the perspective of e ciency, but also because it would seem to make small group collusion quite pro table. And from an e ciency perspective it is far worse than the budget-constrained e ciency we (approximately) obtained in §5.1 above from CLR. This is not to say that using a function other than quadratic has no purpose, nor that CLR will not lead to relative over-funding of projects with a few intense supporters. It may in some cases be useful to replace the square root and square functions with ones that behave more like the absolute value near the origin and only become quadratic further out to avoid large groups engaging in trivial collusions with very small amounts of money each. And CLR does relatively overfund goods with intense supporters, though only in the sense that it has a (quite unimportant) element of Capitalism built into it. But generally, we view these other functional forms primarily as a foil that helps us understand LR and the failures of Capitalism, rather than things we would advocate the use of.
The Henry George Theorem
Thus far we have been casual about how we would imagine LR being funded: we have imagined money "falling from the sky" via well-intentioned philanthropists or being collected from citizens at no cost. In this subsection we take this problem more seriously, though a full solution is beyond the scope of this paper and is a leading direction for future research.
Before diving in, a bit of background is in order. Our problem of how to nance public goods is a classic one and our solution follows in the path of a tradition of solutions pioneered by George (1879) and his most important contemporary academic follower, William Vickrey (1977) .
7 While very general and quite abstract, this "Henry George Theorem" has a simple intuition familiar to most people in a basic case. 8 Consider a town that improves its schools. Typically, real estate values in that town will rise. If people are su ciently mobile, all need houses of the same size and tend to value the schools equally, so the real estate value must rise precisely by the amount that people value the schools. Now suppose this school improvement is costly. It is only worth making if its value is greater than the cost. Thus, if the improvement is worth making, real estate values should rise in the aggregate by more than the cost of improving schools. Thus, if this increase in real estate value could be captured as a tax, this tax would more than nance any improvement to schools that is worth making. A 100% tax on land values thus su ces to fund any improvement worth making to schools, and the same intuition applies to any local public improvement.
While this basic logic was the primary way Henry George himself imagined these ideas and is the easiest to imagine, Vickrey pointed out that the logic was both much broader and, in some sense, narrower than this. Broader because the logic applies not only to schools or other public facilities, but to anything that makes the city a more desirable place to live, including neighborhood amenities provided by artists or restaurants, businesses or public transit that may require subsidies if priced e ciently below cost, the availability of ride hailing services (again which should e ciently be priced below cost; see Arnott, 1996) and so forth. Broader too because the principle applies in settings where land is irrelevant. For example, within a cryptocurrency community we should expect that the value created by open source projects that make the community function better will end up accruing (at least in large part) to those that own the currency or for-pro t businesses running on it. It is narrower, however, because precisely for this reason, it is clearly not only "land" that would need to be taxed, but other "sinks" of value.
Such value sinks may in principle be quite di ferent than land. For example, imagine a world with innite equally good land. But suppose that every family has its own language and cannot learn the languages of other families; thus, little trade and cooperation is possible. Now imagine there are ve people in the entire world who have the capacity to translate among people and enable cooperation, but they can only do this in some localized area and only for a certain number of people, allowing explosive development of civilization only near their physical vicinity. Naturally cities will form around these individuals and they will be able to charge nearly the full value of civilization for their services, as they can always threaten to go and start another civilization elsewhere. In this case, the decreasing return resource to which the value accrues will be these special individuals rather than land.
At its broadest level of generality, the question is how the subsidies required by increasing returns to scale activities should be funded. An activity has increasing returns to scale if it can more cheaply be provided to many people than the sum of the costs of providing it separately to each of these people. Such activities have a marginal cost that is below their average cost and thus should charge a price that, if collected, will not cover the costs of creating it in the rst place. It will therefore require subsidies. Pure public goods are a special case, but public transit, vaccines, software and others all have this property that, if they only charged for the marginal cost of additional uses they would have little chance of covering the cost of creating them in the rst place.
The Henry George Theorem (HGT) gives a general answer to this question. It states that, so long as the value created by these goods exceeds their cost, which it must if they are worth creating, the nancing necessary to support them must accrue as rents or pro ts captured by some declining-returns-to-scale activity such as land, some form of xed capital or a monopoly rent accruing to some agent in the economy. Therefore, it is always possible to fund optimal provision of public goods based on taxing away the rents of declining returns.
The question this obviously raises is how the increasing-returns activities that are worth undertaking can be identi ed and how the rents associated with the decreasing returns to scale activities can be identi ed and taxed without damaging the economy. LR provides a fairly comprehensive answer to the rst question, but does not answer the second one. Nonetheless, examples of decreasing returns goods are not too di cult to enumerate and there are existing taxes explicitly set up to tax them. Congestion pricing on heavily tra cked roads, air tra c rights, taxes on land and corporate pro ts and spectrum policy are all examples of policies designed to tax decreasing returns activities.
Moreover, a modern manifestation of George and Vickrey's ideas suggests a speci c way of identifying decreasing returns activities and their associated rents. Harberger (1965) and more recently Weyl and Zhang (2018) propose a self-assessed tax on capital with a right of compulsory purchase for any buyer willing to pay the possessor's self-assessed price. Because this tax overcomes the monopoly problem of sellers holding out for higher payments for their assets, it can alleviate much of the misallocation of assets, increasing aggregate wealth, at the same time as it taxes away rents associated with xed assets. In this sense, it perfectly ts the bill on the tax side of the HGT. At the same time, it would play an intriguing role in a society governed by LR, as the communities funded by LR would likely be the primary payers of the relevant taxes and thus it would not just serve a funding role, but also a role of allocating assets across communities, allowing them to compete for scarce resources. In this sense, LR paired with Harberger's tax o fers an intriguing vision of a new society with e cient public goods provision funded by e ciency-enhancing taxes.
All that said, a couple of caveats are worth bearing in mind. First, the Harberger tax, while increasing aggregate value overall, is a tax on investment at least when applied to assets that require some investment to maintain, create or improve. Posner and Weyl (2018) argue that at optimal rates on most private capital, the private return on productive investments would be roughly 1 3 of its optimal level. This leads to underfunding of private goods in much the same manner as public goods are underfunded when α = 1 3 in §5.1 above. This points towards an interesting equilibrium, a society in which all investments, private or public, are underfunded by the same ratio (perhaps 3) and thus there is no bias across di ferent scales of projects. This would be a satisfying resolution to Galbraith (1958) claim that many societies face "public poverty" amid "private a uence".
A more serious concern is that some rents end up accruing not to xed physical capital but to human capital or in the relationships among citizens who are nonetheless a small part of the broader society. Our example above of the ve translators is a clear case, as would be any public good that increased global happiness for all equally in a world with a constant population: these bene ts would not a fect prices and would exclusively accrue directly to such citizens.
To the extent this is the case, such rents cannot be captured by any known e cient tax; distortive income taxes are the only widely accepted method. This may lead to greater under-funding of public goods and even private capital investment, and relative over-investment in personal capacities on which rents can freely be earned. Addressing this problem is far beyond the scope of this paper, but we suspect it would become a leading social concern in an LR society.
Failures of concavity and dynamic solutions
Above we assumed that all functions V p i were smooth and concave. When they are not this does not create a signi cant problem for our analysis, but it does mean that it may be ideal to structure the format of the mechanism to avoid this causing any problems.
To make things concrete, consider the case in which the value derived from a public good is S-shaped (sinusoidal) and thus unless the good is funded "su ciently" very little value derives from it, whereas once it is funded su ciently the marginal value of funding quickly diminishes. This is a natural structure for projects with a nearly-xed budget, like a work of public infrastructure. In this case, citizens will not be willing to contribute unless they expect others to do so as well.
A natural solution to this problem is what is often called an "assurance contract" and was proposed by Dybvig and Spatt (1983) . The most natural implementation is dynamic, and we suspect this is how an LR mechanism would operate in practice in any case, but static implementations are also possible. Essentially, a window is open for contributions and withdrawals of contributions to the mechanism to change during a period. Citizens are thus able to contribute without fear that they will be left "exposed" to the risk that others will not contribute. Given this, every citizen may as well make a reasonable contribution until the relevant threshold has been reached. In the spirit of Tabarrok (1998) , an entrepreneur con dent that a good is worth funding can further sweeten the deal by o fering citizens a payment if they agree to temporarily fund the mechanism to avoid any potential even weak coordination problem.
10
This dynamic implementation is very likely to be desirable even if V p i is concave, as the optimal contribution will still depend on others' contributions. Thus, it makes little practical di ference whether the value functions are concave, except possibly for the chance of a weak cold start problem, which a Tabarrok-style scheme could address. Similar points apply to cases in which smoothness fails, but given the uncertainty that is in any case likely to prevail in most cases we do not think such cases are likely to be generic. §6 Applications
We discuss several applications of LR in order to illustrate the importance of its many nice features in practice. We choose these examples not necessarily because they are the most important or pressing, but because they nicely illustrate the range of cases, across quite distinct domains, where we believe LR can be useful in the relatively near term.
Campaign finance
In the US, the regulation of individual and collective contributions to political campaigns has been hotly debated since the rst attempts to regulate campaign nance in the mid-1800s. The 1971 Federal Election Campaigns Act and subsequent amendments introduced extensive rules and procedures for campaign funding geared toward balancing transparency and equity with freedom of expression, and established the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) to regulate the fundraising activities of candidates for public ofce. Campaign nance issues frequently make their way to the Supreme Court-and the court's Citizens United decision has maintained a steady stream of vigorous opposition since its ruling in 2010.
The proposals for campaign nance reform are manifold. Suggesting modi cations to municipal, state, and federal election law, these proposals range from simple tweaks of existing laws (e.g. capping contributions, stricter enforcement, restricting contributions from unions and corporations, etc.) to extensive re-envisioning of electoral systems (e.g. public nancing schemes, anonymous capped contributions, etc.). 11 The proposals for reform o fer solutions to the core legal and political question: How can regulatory bodies strike a balance between freedom of expression through contributions to campaigns for elected o ce, while restricting the undue in uence of special interests?
The motivating problem for campaign nance reform can be analyzed using the formal apparatus presented in previous sections. When un-checked, permissive campaign nance laws such as the ones upheld in Citizens United are simple capitalistic contributory schemes. As demonstrated above, the Capitalism mechanism for exible funding of public goods leads to tyranny of the few who have resources to make very large contributions. In the campaign nance setting, the failure of a capitalistic mechanism implies that on the margin, only a single contributor (the largest contributor) has any in uence on the margin. The motivating problem of campaign nance is Capitalism's vulnerability to tyranny of the rich, especially when one considers the possibility for quid pro quo corruption. Just as the LR mechanism answers to this central problem of capitalistic funding, it provides a template for a new proposal for campaign nance reform.
functions at a single point. Any sinusoidal structure that is smooth will destroy this and lead to arbitrary underfunding, whatever the "assurance" structure. This is also true with the literally discontinuous payo f function for generic informational structures on values (Mailath and Postlewaite, 1990) . 11 For in uential discussions of campaign nance reform, see Ackerman and Ayres (2002) and Lessig (2011) .
The LR mechanism solves the key problem of funding under Capitalism by boosting the contributions of small donors, thereby e fectively diluting the in uence of larger ones. Under other Capitalismbased schemes, individuals able to make only small contributions have no incentive to contribute, knowing that their contributions are just a drop in the bucket. Under LR-based campaign nance, all individuals have incentive to contribute so long as their evaluation of the candidate is positive. This fact also has good second-order outcomes that are the converse of the quid pro quo corruption under Capitalismsince all individuals have incentive to contribute, campaigning politicians thus have to give some weight to every individual in their electorate. Under LR-based campaign nance, fundraising and outreach are intertwined, leading politicians to engage more thoroughly and deeply with their electorate.
The rationale for moving toward LR in campaign nance in part parallels the rationale behind existing political matching funds. Public matching funds for campaigns-such as the federal matching fund for presidential elections 12 and municipal and state matching funds for legislatures and mayoral races 13 -aim to amplify small contributions to campaigns for elected o ce. Thus, like the LR mechanism, matching funds subsidize small contributions. Yet matching funds systems are highly arbitrary: often they match contributions up to some level with some multiple, and then nothing beyond this level. How is this level and the amount of the match chosen? Shouldn't there be a more gradual taper of matching commitments? LR gives precisely an optimal mechanism for achieving this.
Furthermore, while the usual rationale behind matching systems, at least as described to the public, is some pretense of equity, the rationale for an LR-based system does not even rely on an argument from equity. Indeed, LR is an (approximately) optimal mechanism from an e ciency perspective as we showed in §5.1 above. LR for campaign nance is thus joined to matching funds proposals in spirit, while o fering substantial improvements over these existing proposals in practice.
The e ciency rationale for LR and the fact that it does not tax speech has another important practical bene t: it would likely pass constitutional muster even under the post-Citizens United state of American constitutional law. Large contributions are not taxed as we showed in §5.1. Thus, the system simply boosts the relative importance of small donors.
Precisely how to apply LR in the context of campaigns would still have some signi cant subtlety. Should there continue to be contribution limits until enough funds can be raised to make α reasonably high? What should a campaign have to do to be allowed to list in the system? How much should di ferent candidates be allowed to form "parties" than then disperse funds to their candidates? Should contributions be public or doubly blind (as in Chile) so that candidates and parties do not know their own contributors to avoid corruption and collusion? But overall, we believe the structure of LR/CLR would dramatically simplify the byzantine patchwork of current campaign nance regulations.
Open source software communities
The open source software movement is based on the principle that code is or should be a public good. Software is a classic example of an increasing returns activity, as it is nearly costless to copy and apply broadly, yet has potentially large upfront development costs, especially when the uncertainty of any solution working out is factored in. Many in the software community view exclusionary capitalist solutions as wildly ine cient and undesirable, yet democratic or government-driven provision is usually far too hi-erarchical and centralized for fast moving technology appreciated primarily at rst by a small community of geeks. This has led to a powerful movement of open source developers; see Benkler (2007) for a classic exposition of this view.
Yet, as Lanier (2013) argues, in many ways the open source movement has been a failure. It almost always relies on some level of proprietary corporate backing or directed, hierarchical government support, and even then almost all contributors tend to be geeky men from privileged backgrounds, as others cannot a ford to give their time away in this manner. Many if not most of the bene ts of such systems have increasingly been captured by "central nodes" or what Lanier calls "siren servers" such as Google and Facebook, and the systems do not seem to serve the broad public well.
Open source communities are increasingly trying to address these limitations and provide funding for public goods provision through open source development through a variety of methods. Two particularly popular recent examples are cryptocurrencies and crowdfunding.
The crowdfunding solution is that developers can post projects and solicit voluntary contributions, sometimes in exchange for a token related to the project or other small consideration. While such approaches have had some success, they ultimately push the problem of charitable funding in Capitalism back just one layer, onto those who are supposed to contribute without any prospect of a commensurate return on the marginal contributions they make. Thus, instead of the open source developers directly donating their time, here crowd funders may also jump in. Ultimately, though, the problems are very similar.
Blockchain-based development communities, such as Ethereum and Zcash, have taken a quite di ferent approach. They are based around currencies intended to represent the value of the ecosystem and a signi cant part of this currency is reserved by foundations associated to each community that intend to make grants to support public goods within the community. Furthermore, several community members who have grown personally wealthy through the bubbles created by speculation on the success of these technologies have a philanthropic, and possibly also speculative, interest in seeing the communities thrive and are thus willing to contribute to this out of their personal holdings. At present, this primarily occurs through a reasonably centralized process of grant-making by leaders who hold formal and informal authority within these foundations. However, such a hierarchical structure seems both poorly attuned to the needs of the communities and, perhaps more importantly, antithetical to the principles of decentralized authority on which they were founded.
The LR mechanism seems a good t to address both sets of problems and for the culture of the relevant communities. For crowd-funding, it is easy to imagine a philanthropist, such as one of the leaders of the technology industry who has grown rich o f the value created on the internet, sponsoring a crowdfunding website that uses CLR to support crowd-funded open source projects. Many such leaders want to "give back" but don't always feel quali ed or do not have the bandwidth to go around giving out grants. CLR in a crowd-funding setting seems a natural remedy.
The t is even clearer within blockchain communities. These communities are awash in funds given the hundreds of billions of dollars resting in cryptocurrency market capitalizations, a large percentage of which is held by foundations or wealthy individuals strongly committed to the principle of decentralizing power and interested in contributing towards stimulating public goods provision within the communities. We suspect that such environments will be the rst domain of practical application of the LR mechanism.
Yet even more exciting is the prospect of new blockchain communities, whether currencies, tokenbased communities or other internal projects, that are built upon LR principles, coupled with relevant tax supports. Such communities could act as an exciting testing ground for the LR mechanism and could organically grow if the logic of the HGT works to set o f explosive growth by funding relevant public goods whose value is then recycled by taxation into further such activities.
The largest practical impediment to achieving this is the anonymity and pseudonimity that is so pervasive within such communities. Clearly, LR relies heavily on separate human identities and can easily be exploited if identities can be replicated. Whether these di culties can be overcome is an interesting question that experimentation and technological advances for identity solutions will reveal.
News media finance
The production of news is perhaps the perfect application for the LR mechanism. On the one hand, (especially high-quality, investigative) news is perhaps the clearest example of a public good. It can be costly to create, but it is essentially impossible to exclude anyone from consuming it beyond a very tiny window of time and thus it is very di cult to earn value without highly costly and wasteful mechanisms of exclusion. This problem has become increasingly acute with the rise of information and communications technology, leading to an increasing sense of crisis in the funding of news, which some have even labeled as "existential" (Foer, 2017 ).
Yet news is also often relevant to a very broad community, making purely charitable funding di cult to pull o f. This creates a strong desire for public funding and is the reason that governments all over the world are involved in news production. However, the drawbacks of government involvement in news creation could hardly be more evident, given the central role of media in holding governments to account.
LR o fers a potentially appealing resolution. Governments and philanthropists interested in supporting high-quality news without exerting or being seen to exert undue in uence over content could use CLR to e fectively match donations to news creators in much the way that they already match contributions to organizations like National Public Radio in the United States. Using CLR rather than standard matching would create much greater e ciency and require far less targeted and discretionary applications of funds, instead allowing a truly diverse ecosystem of potentially new and innovative news outlets to ourish.
Given the ways in which the technology of news creation and distribution is changing, an exclusive focus on long-established outlets that currently receive matching funds seems misplaced, yet governments and philanthropists are struggling to distinguish which new initiatives are worthy of support without tipping the scales towards outlets that support their interests. CLR seems a perfect match for this problem and, given the prevalence of contributions towards public broadcasting, would be largely familiar to many potential contributors. In this area it is not even hard to imagine democratic governments voting to raise additional tax revenues to support such an initiative, especially at local levels of government where investigative journalism by local news sources has been particularly hard hit.
Yet while news is a leading example where governments and philanthropists want to and do use matching funds to support a more "market-driven" approach to giving away money, it is far from the only such domain. Tax deductibility of charitable contributions is essentially a match, and many corporations further match charitable contributions by their employees.
Many philanthropists provide matches to favorite charities and many are seeking more creative ways to harness decentralized or information outside the philanthropist's whims to give away money; witness the "open philanthropy" and "e fective altruism" movements. Across a wide range of domains, from funding educational start-ups to large scale interventions in developing countries, CLR holds potential to provide more accurate and less hierarchical signals for directing charitable funds. This seems increasingly relevant as backlash continues to grow against the top-down dictates of well-intentioned but ultimately elitist class of donors (Easterly, 2007; Giriharadas, 2018) .
Municipal projects and public works
While urbanists have long recognized the importance of community-level decision-making in cities, cities often lack mechanisms that allow goods valued in communities to emerge. LR, as applied to urban public funding decisions, could allow communities at all scales to fund projects that would struggle to get funding under centralized systems. A growing body of evidence suggests that policies emphasizing community values and diversity generate major improvements in city life. The city is thus lush with opportunities for economic prosperity, if small communities are able to ourish.
But city councils and other municipal governments struggle to meet the needs of subcommunities. Even though they are democratic systems intended to represent the will of a constituency, the needs of very small groups cannot be heard for reasons we have discussed. Some public goods are intensely important to a select few, for example a small group of households clustered in a few city blocks. And yet, the systems in place for communicating those needs and receiving the adequate funding are highly ine cient. First, a councilmember representing those few city blocks must understand the importance of the public good to this fraction of her constituency in order to propose its funding to the council. Then, funding for that good is put to a council vote. That localized public good will fail to get funding when put to a city-wide vote, because the city councilmember representing that block will only get one vote when the council goes to vote.
It is clear that 1p1v does badly for funding municipal projects valued by a select few, and capitalist contributory schemes do little better. Artistic and cultural community centers-no doubt public goods that allow cities to thrive-rely heavily on private donors. Some artistic and cultural centers have no trouble getting funded through capitalist contributory schemes in cities, due to the recognition and signaling that comes with a donation to a famous public space, such as the agship branch of the New York Public Library in Bryant Park (renamed the Stephen A. Schwarzman library in 2008). Few will make contributions, but it's unlikely that the famed branch will soon struggle to keep the lights on. In contrast, the smaller local Macomb's Bridge branch on 152 nd street in Harlem, survived as a 685-square-foot studio apartment with a maximum occupancy of 25 from its founding in 1955 until nally getting a long overdue upgrade in 2017.
14 The merits of LR as applied to city planning align nicely with the ideas advanced by some of the most prominent modern urban theorists. Activist and intellectual Jane Jacobs (1961) famously condemned the urban planning ethos of her time, exempli ed by Robert Moses's aggressive urban renewal policies. She argued that rationalist urban planners do a poor job serving the needs of actual city-dwellers, undoing the sense of community that makes people move to cities in the rst place through their top-down, deductive approach to allocation and decision-making. She argued for the need for diversity and community in cities by tracing the economic bene ts from their sources to their higher order consequences. Florida (2002 Florida ( , 2008 brings compelling evidence and a contemporary perspective to theories shaped by Jacobs' work. His theory posits an emergent "creative class" of city-dwellers, whose diversity promotes the economic prosperity of the cities they call home. The creative class includes scientists, engineers and researchers as well as musical, visual and literary artists and others "whose economic function is to create new ideas, new technology or new creative content" (Florida, 2002) . Florida argues that these individuals pursue a diverse set of creative activities and are attracted by groups of like-minded creatives who share their interests, such as vibrant informal music scenes, skate parks, outdoors activities, hip art venues and co fee shop culture.
Most of these goods are di cult or impossible for city-level o cials to provide or even foster in a timely manner as many of the creative class have little access to or interest in the formal levers of power and are fragmented and diverse in their interests. Economic development, Florida and Jacob agree, requires community-level decision-making in urban planning because a centralized rationalist perspective will never confer on cities the kind of diversity that makes them hum.
The city is a fertile site for application of LR, and these applications are among the most promising in terms of feasibility of self-funding. If LR were applied to funding allocations for municipal projects and public works in cities, the system would have a good chance of funding itself by the logic of the HGT discussed in §5.5. Vickrey (1977) himself observed that the logic of the HGT applies to any public good that makes a city more appealing, community level or broader. By the logic long-held by political economists and urban theorists alike, the sorts of goods that would get funded under LR are the very goods that would create increasing returns. §7 Discussion
In addition to its practical applications, the framework developed in the preceding sections provides a lucid illustration and a potential resolution of a key tension in liberal political thought. The so-called "communitarian" critiques of liberalism come in various stripes, but all stem from the view that liberalism over-emphasizes the individual at the expense of community. We argue that the LR mechanism, as we have presented it in previous sections, o fers a blueprint for a new variant of liberalism that furnishes a novel answer to entrenched communitarian critiques. We call this variant Liberal Radicalism and also refer to it by the initials LR where it does not cause confusion.
The liberal dream
Liberalism is a word we use often in this paper and it carries many meanings to many people. Our intention is to refer to a broad political theory, closely associated with the tradition of the Enlightenment. That tradition opposes arbitrary or historically-derived centralized authority. It favors-to the maximum extent consistent with social order-social systems that are neutral across reasonable competing conceptions of the good life held by individual citizens.
We can thus formulate the commitments of liberalism-as we conceive of it here-in terms of two fundamental desiderata: D1. Facilitation of individuals' pursuit of reasonable conceptions of the good.
D2. Neutrality across reasonable conceptions of the good.
Liberal societies, aim to set up policies and institutions that achieve D1 and D2, as long as those institutions can be reconciled with social order.
Of course these two desiderata on their own leave many ethical, political, and epistemological questions open for debate. What constitutes a reasonable conception of how to live? With what degree of social order must D1 and D2 be compatible? How does one judge whether satisfactory social order has been achieved? What sorts of social institutions most successfully achieve D1 and D2? Answering these and related questions has kept several centuries of liberal theorists busy. For the present discussion, which focuses on the central tensions in the very foundations of liberal thought and yet is extremely brief, cannot provide anything like a complete resolution. For the present moment, we roughly view "social order" as a feasible and sustainable set of arrangements (one that does not undermine itself) and as to institutions, we leave them at the level of abstraction of the mechanisms we described paired with some of the user interface and security considerations we highlighted.
One key issue we omit is questions of distributive justice. We skirt distributive issues here for several reasons. First, in the liberal-communitarian debate, distributive issues play out on particularly swampy terrain. Liberals and communitarians both espouse ideas anywhere along the distributive spectrum, based in egalitarian or hierarchical distributive principles, or in principles somewhere in between. There are "libertarians" and "left liberals" who agree on liberal principles but sharply diverge on distributive issues, and there are hierarchical traditionalist communitarians as well as contemporary multiculturalist egalitarian communitarians.
Furthermore, lack of clarity on distributive issues squares with our formal analysis in the preceding sections and our philosophical analysis in the present section are both entirely indi ferent to distributive issues. While certain aspects of LR may be more or less appealing to egalitarians or those favoring hierarchical societies, 15 the theory allows for the consideration of how or what to maximize (equality? of what?) to be settled separately from the foundational issues discussed here. Our use of the Kaldor-Hicks welfare standard allows for this separation of distributive and foundational issues-as this standard is capacious enough to allow for non-utilitarian maximization.
The Basic Communitarian Critique
From its foundations in Enlightenment thinking to its successes guiding the French and American Revolutions, liberalism has been forced to contend with the problem of collective organization. How can a government, committed to ensuring that individuals have the ability to pursue their own conceptions of the good, sustain collective organization of any sort? We call this problem for liberalism the Basic Communitarian Critique:
Basic Communitarian Critique: A state cannot sustain the communities valued by individuals while remaining neutral among their competing conceptions of the good life. This critique suggests a major blind spot in the foundations of liberalism. Sometimes, individual conceptions of the good impart value on various forms of community. However, liberalism's focus on the individual and on neutrality makes it di cult for those communities to thrive. This criticism can be framed in terms of the desiderata outlined above: D1 and D2 on their own may undermine community. And if the community is valued by individuals, then liberalism fails on its own terms. So, the Basic Communitarian Critique suggests adding another desideratum to the table:
D3. Fostering of communiy.
The liberal-communitarian debate, stemming from the Basic Communitarian Critique's attention to this blind spot of liberalism's most fundamental desiderata, has been around as long as liberalism itself. In some ways, the development of liberalism-in politics and philosophy-can be understood as a sequence of proposals for new ways of resolving practical and theoretical communitarian worries, while holding fast to liberal ideals.
The earliest and simplest communitarian critique was that of Hobbes (1651) , who argued that individuals unchecked by central authority would make life "solitary, brutish and short." A central founding document of modern liberalism was Locke (1689)'s argument that popular sovereignty could address Hobbes's critique in a manner consistent with the three fundamental desiderata (D1, D2, D3) outlined thus far. Locke argued that the best way to allow for necessary collective organization within liberalism was to set up a government by and for the people. In order for the state to protect basic rights and adjudicate between competing demands, it ought to set up a government that in some manner re ects the desires of the governed. In the era following the American and French revolutions, the new states sought the ideal form of democracy that would maintain these desiderata, as can be seen by the slogans of "liberty" and "fraternity" of the time.
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A range of proposals for liberal democratic systems emerged in the era following the revolutions in the U.S. and France. And yet, the conversations surrounding these proposals made clear the tensions between liberalism and democracy. In the U.S., for example, the protection of minority rights was a dominant theme at the Constitutional Convention. While democratic governance addressed a basic communitarian issue with liberalism-how is any collective organization possible without a non-neutral central authority-majoritarian rule opens the door for the suppression of minority interests and thus a bias towards majority ways of living. Indeed, Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America (1835-1840), the culmination of his visit to the U.S., he remarked upon the myriad ways in which democracy and liberalism were out of sync in the edgling nation. Liberalism, democracy and minority protection seemed to Tocqueville di cult to achieve all at once. Tocqueville's description of the importance of New England townships-small communities that exempli ed the ability of individuals to thrive within a collective-summarizes the tensions he observed. It is in the township, he wrote, Tocqueville saw in the townships both the importance and the fragility of the simultaneous satisfaction of the three fundamental desiderata, D1, D2 and D3. Townships were critical to sustaining liberty, and yet endangered both by individualism and by national or even state majority rule, which could easily undermine and defund them. Our formal analysis of the public goods problem neatly summarizes this tension. In so doing, it allows us to make a novel intervention in the liberal-communitarian debate: formalized problems suggest formal solutions.
Recall from §3 the suboptimal funding mechanism which we called Capitalism. Under Capitalism, individuals contribute to the public good according to how much they value it. This mechanism illustrates the problem with liberalism in its purest form, and substantiates the Basic Communitarian Critique. The Capitalist mechanism allows for the funding of a public good to operate exactly like the funding of a private good. This system is procedurally neutral across individuals' competing conceptions of the 16 As noted above, we abstract here from questions of "equality". good because it confers on individuals the freedom to contribute however much they can to goods that they value. The procedure for funding public goods, according to the capitalist mechanism, theoretically allows individuals to express via their contributions exactly how much they value the good in question.
Because the level of funding of a public good cannot scale with the number of individuals who bene t from the good, the mechanism leads to severe underfunding. Thus, as the Basic Communitarian Critique goes, there is a bias against funding goods that may be valued by more than one person. Underfunding in the capitalist mechanism leads to fractionalization-as individuals nd themselves unable to enjoy goods of value to groups, they are left to place greater weight on goods valued only to themselves.
The Multiculturalist Critique
How does democratic governance respond to-and fail to respond to-the Basic Communitarian Critique? The "1p1v" mechanism for funding public goods holds some hints. In 1p1v, as in democratic governance, individuals vote on whether they value a public good, with each individual allowed to cast exactly one vote, and then the public good is funded entirely through taxes and transfers. This mechanism still contains an important dose of liberal spirit in that it is procedurally neutral. There is nothing in the procedure that prevents individuals from expressing, via a referendum, whether they value the good in question.
And yet, 1p1v is suboptimal from an e ciency standpoint, as we saw, because the median is often a poor approximation for the mean. Thus, 1p1v may lead to overfunding or underfunding of a public good. But one thing is certain: 1p1v is systematically biased against public goods valued by a small minority community. The suboptimality of 1p1v is thus a formal analogue of the worries about the protection of minorities that plagued the framers of the U.S. constitution, and of the idea that tyranny of the majority is an inevitability for democracy. Tocqueville's fears for community life under democracy are another clear example.
So, just as democracy goes part of the way toward resolving the Basic Communitarian Critique but introduces a new set of issues around the suppression of minority groups, 1p1v has advantages over the Capitalist mechanism, and yet presents problems of its own. What is clear in both systems is that liberalism struggles to protect minority communities. Capitalism underfunds all communities, while 1p1v suppresses minority voices. While it is far older, and shows up clearly in Tocqueville, for resonance with contemporary debates we call this criticism the Multiculturalist Critique.
The Multiculturalist Critique: Standard demoracy leads to systematic biases against minority groups and communities.
Again we can understand the Multiculturalist Critique in terms of the three fundamental desiderata: there is no way to have D1, D2 and D3 all at once. Democracies within liberalism do a poor job of securing D3, and further, it is unclear what sort of system compatible with D1 and D2 could genuinely achieve D3.
The Multiculturalist Critique is echoed in analyses of liberalism and democracy like Tocqueville's, but has been especially central to the thought of contemporary communitarians' work. Charles Taylor (1994) and Iris Marion Young (2000) , for example, nd majoritarian democracy lacking precisely because of the potential for suppression of minority communities by forcing every citizen to choose between a single hegemonic national community and atomization.
1p1v democracy is a blunt tool for resolving the competing demands of factions and subgroups of a citizenry. At best, it goes part of the way toward resolving the deep central tension of liberalism. At worst, it is fundamentally illiberal, allowing for no diversity among communities. If some semblance of liberalism is to be rescued under democracy, it will require the granting of basic rights to individuals and communities, which is di cult (if not impossible) to do in a neutral way. Capitalism raises the Basic Communitarian Critique. While 1p1v responds to the Basic Communitarian Critique, it raises the Multiculturalist Critique.
A history of Liberal Radicalism
The LR mechanism, with its formal advantages over Capitalism and 1p1v, answers accordingly to both the Basic Communitarian and Multiculturalist Critiques. We showed formally that LR is the optimal mechanism. It allows for the funding of public goods valued in small communities, thus it is not systematically biased against minority interests. It also maintains neutrality among competing interests.
Consequently, Liberal Radicalism, a political philosophy based in the LR mechanism, resolves an important aspect of the abiding disagreement between liberals and communitarians. Our formal analysis is grounded in positions advanced by liberal thinkers who were attentive to communitarian concerns throughout the history of liberalism. Notably, Tocqueville's political theory, stemming from his own resolution of the frictions he observed between liberalism and democracy, is a historical precedent for LR. Tocqueville argued that localized collective organization is necessary, but if society becomes so localized so as to be atomistic, liberal resistance to central authority is impossible. Similar ideas were also advanced by later liberal thinkers, notably Henry George, Beatrice and Sidney Webb and Hannah Arendt.
The name "radicalism" is particularly associated with these rst two and "radical" parties such as the Danish Radikale Venstre and the various Radical parties led by Georges Clemenceau in France, as well as the "new Liberal" party of David Lloyd George in England, drew much of their inspiration from these ideas. George and the Webbs, writing in response to rise of industrialism, both advanced reforms that align with our presentation of Liberal Radicalism. George (1879) held that the agglomeration and community necessary for cities and commerce, ignored by previous economists, had been perverted by individualism as a basis for market power and rents that fueled inequality and held resources away from their best uses. He argued that these rents from communities belonged to these communities collectively and ought to be taxed in order to fund community-oriented public goods, an idea which is encapsulated by his eponymous theorem discussed in §5.5. The resonance with and direct relevance to LR is clear.
The Webbs (1897) applied similar insights to the agglomerations of business capital that, because of economies of scale, could not simply be broken up as antitrust authorities in the US (inspired by George) attempted. They argued that corporations were the collective creations of networks of association and cooperation among their workers and that the fruits of these communities were wastefully captured and dominated by the capitalist nanciers of these enterprises. They argued for "industrial democracy" in which labor unions and other democratically-governed overlapping intermediary organizations would help check and channel the power of corporate interests. Such an ecosystem draws on Tocqueville's insights about the importance of community to liberalism while connecting it to industrial society and is precisely the sort of ecosystem LR seeks to foster. Arendt (1951) picked up most directly Tocqueville's ideas. She applied Tocqueville's criticisms to the extreme capitalism and unchecked democracy of the interwar period, arguing that the rise of totalitarianism was a result of excessive atomization that left the national democratic community as the only basis for collective organization. Atomized individuals desperate for community and left by liberalism only with a national state as a locus for it, embraced the unmediated and unlimited connection to the state that totalitarianism o fered. Capitalism and democracy thus, without further layers of organization, led to their opposite.
Contemporary liberal thinkers have tried to respond to the challenges of multiculturalism and identity politics in a similar spirit. For example, both in his scholarly work (2005) and in his more popular writing (2006), Kwame Anthony Appiah has sought to build a liberal philosophy that is deeply engaged with the richness of human identity and community and yet which resists essentialist or eternal claims of such groups to allow for a liberal, free-owing and evolving de nition of identities that serve individuals. It is precisely this spirit that LR is intended to manifest and it was a class on these books that inspired one of us to rst engage with these questions, hence the dedication with which we begin this piece.
Liberal Radicalism v. Liberal Individualism
Our analysis can be seen as attempt to mathematically formalize these streams of thoughts, o fering a framework for a novel solution. The LR mechanism thus guides us toward a new resolution of aspects the liberal-communitarian debate. In order to further articulate our intervention on the liberalcommunitarian debate, we pose LR against what we call Liberal Individualism (LI), illustrating the philosophical merits of the former through a dialectic with the latter. We focus on LI as it is a well-represented position in history and political philosophy, and perhaps even the dominant strand of liberal thought underpinning modern liberal democracies.
The Liberal Individualist has a natural response to our formulation of the Basic Communitarian and Multiculturalist Critiques. There is no feasible way to have neutrality across all competing conceptions of the good, and thus they must choose a particular form of neutrality. As individualists, they value the bene ts that accrue to individuals above all else. Thus, if they cannot be neutral across all competing conceptions, they can at least be neutral among atomized conceptions of the good. The Liberal Individualist may propose a new desideratum to replace universalistic neutrality:
D2' : Neutrality across atomistic conceptions of the good.
Let's formulate this dialectic in terms of the three fundamental desiderata. The Liberal Individualist wants D1 and D2. The communitarian charges the Liberal Individualist with ignoring D3, the need to allow for the provision of public goods valued by communities, groups, and other non-atomistic units. Since the provision of public goods valued in communities may be entailed in individuals own conceptions of the good, D1 sometimes entails D3. Thus Liberal Individualism is not internally consistent-it fails on its own terms.
The critiques substantiated by our public goods model suggest that LI is not neutral across competing conceptions of the good. LI fails to get D3, which may itself be entailed by D1. And thus the Liberal Individualist cannot be neutral across all competing conceptions. The natural response is then to argue that it is impossible to be neutral across all conceptions. So, the Liberal Individualists propose D2' in place of D2-neutrality across atomistic conceptions of the good.
Communitarian Critique of Individualism: D1 sometimes entails D3 and the Liberal Individualist cannot have D1, D2 and D3 at the same time.
Liberal Individualist Response: There is no feasible way to have D1, D2 and D3 at the same time, so we propose D2'. We can have D1, D2' and D3 and that is the best we could possibly do.
In the face of this Liberal Individualist response to the critiques, our analysis of the LR mechanism serves as an existence proof, of sorts. LR provides a way to have D1, D2 and D3-to allow for goods valued in atomistic and non-atomistic units, while remaining substantively neutral about competing conceptions of the good. The optimality of the LR mechanism demonstrates a feasible alternative to the standard solutions to public goods provision. The neutrality of LR stems from its allowing any set of public goods to emerge that are proposed by citizens and its support for community arises from its nonlinear form that o fsets the free rider problem at all levels of social organization-from relatively small communities, to larger labor unions up to a nation state and even global governance. It supports community optimally while being neutral not just about the aims of communities, but even about the level and form of their organization.
To summarize, we used the formal framework developed in preceding sections to substantiate the communitarian critique. A possible Liberal Individualist response to this critique is that there is no feasible way to get neutrality across all competing conceptions. Thus the Liberal Individualist has no choice but to settle for neutrality across atomistic conceptions. We invalidate this Liberal Individualist response to the communitarian critique by posing a feasible alternative: LR. LR o fers a way of guaranteeing D1, D2 and D3, as demonstrated through its optimality in the dynamic, self-organizing provision of public goods.
There are two remaining responses to consider: one from liberals and one from communitarians. A committed individualist-often called a "perfectionist" in political philosophy 17 -might argue that LR is not an improvement over LI. In fact, such a committed individualist might contend that individuals ought to strive toward more atomized than non-atomistic views of the good. Pursuit of atomized conceptions of the good is the most thorough and maximal way to enhance autonomy.
While this extreme individualism view may be a valid criticism of LR (see Dagan, Forthcoming for a rough articulation of this view), we nd it largely implausible. Even extreme individualists tend to acknowledge the value of some forms of social life such as family, religious groups, etc. Furthermore, even if such an extreme individualist is willing to give up on all forms of e cacious community not supported by capitalist monopolies or charity, they face deeper problems funding any good valued in groups, as illustrated by the failures of the Capitalist mechanism in the public goods problem. For example, perfectionist liberals cannot support any public goods with economies of scale, such as public transit, without large losses to e ciency and thus to the scope of freedom a forded to the citizens they seek to empower.
An interesting manifestation of this tension in a somewhat more broadly-discussed setting is the particular form of egalitarian but nonetheless extreme individualism proposed by many advocates of Universal Basic Income (UBI), such as Van Parijs (1995) . He argues that the central goal of a just society should be to provide the maximum possible unconditional UBI to every citizen to maximize the e fective freedom citizens have to determine their life course independent of the demand of their peers, an ideal that many political scientists believe was important to Scandinavian conceptions of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990 ).
Yet it is not only this freedom from work requirements that have made Scandinavian societies something of a model. It is rather the strength of public good provision and community. While Scandinavians may have the freedom to drop social ties and, as Van Parijs suggests, live a solitary life as a surfer, one of the most striking aspects of life in Scandinavia is actually the strength of social bonds and the wide range of public goods provided at every level of social organization. It is further remarkable how much of the support for individuals comes though these collective institutions rather than direct cash payments. A high UBI within an otherwise atomized capitalist society may be an ideal for extreme individualists of an egalitarian bent, but it does not seem an adequate description of what people admire about models like Scandinavia. While more equally distributing wealth and income as UBI would may be desirable, we nd recent proposals such as Van Parijs's to o fer thin visions of productive society.
Liberal Radicalism v. Illiberal Communitarianism
Communitarians might also have remaining complaints against our LR. In particular, a communitarian could argue that the neutrality we get in our conception still fails to be neutral in important ways. Our concept of substantive neutrality is morally individualist and based on a preference-aggregating notion of neutrality.
Responses from communitarians in this vein are valid in principle, but strike us as a bit hasty in practice. After all, we have little experience of what an LR society would look like in practice. It might continue to do violence of communitarians' notion of community. Yet, given that most communitarians have been mostly critical and have not proposed an alternative scheme of social organization, it is hard to know if this is the case or not. Clearly an LR society would be dramatically more conducive to a range of collective endeavors than any presently existing society. It seems to us that it would be at least worth seeing if such a society allayed many communitarian critiques before rejecting it outright.
Furthermore, many of the communitarians we have cited above, while critical of the atomization of liberalism, are equally critical of nearly all the more community-oriented schemes and political movements of recent times, especially various forms of ethnonationalism or state socialism that are on the rise today. Without a clear alternative to LI or to these populist movements, it seems worth it for many of them to consider whether the clear design of LR o fers a way to satisfy their concerns without giving succor to alternatives they fear more.
We have little, however, to say to communitarians more sympathetic to these authoritarian inclinations, beyond the theoretical arguments about-and historical example of-the abuse of such power that liberals, such as Acton (1887), have been o fering for at least the last four hundred years. LR is indeed morally individualist in that it uses a individual welfare criterion to assess the bene ts that accrue to individuals. However, even this critique o fers an opportunity to distinguish our morally individualist stance from a structural individualist stance that marks most Liberal Individualists. Structural individualists fundamentally subscribe to a notion of private goods-goods can only accrue to one individual or another and not several individuals at once. Our moral individualism allows for good to accrue to individuals as well as communities-public goods are truly public under our moral individualism. Thus, another way of understanding our argument is that we have shown a way in which moral individualists can support community-oriented structures.
The limits of Liberal Radicalism
Before proceeding to more general remarks, we re ect brie y on the aims, intentions, and limits of our theory. LR, insofar as it solves the liberal-communitarian debate, is not a fully-articulated ideology but rather a framework for further political theorizing. We have presented formal rules for designing neutral societies that demand re nement and translation into other modes of communication before guiding the designs of actual institutions.
Up to this point, there is still room for liberals and communitarians alike to object to our resolution. They may appreciate that the LR mechanism has valuable properties for distributing public goods, but that appreciation may be decidedly casual, reaching no deeper than approval of capitalistic markets as valuable mechanisms for the distribution of private goods. In the design of institutions based in LR, one might argue, liberals and communitarians both would require that LR be subject to various constraints that protect minority interests and communal values. And then, if such constraints are required, it is unclear whether LR is really an improvement over any existing system that is also subject to a complex set of constraints.
A feature of our unusual methodology-using mechanism design to make an argument in politics and philosophy-is that it is di cult to distinguish between our use of the mechanism in actual proposals and in arguments demonstrating the virtues of particular philosophical positions. The LR mechanism is a model, but what is the precise role of the model in designing, justifying, and explaining new proposals or philosophical positions? This problem is not new in political philosophy. The tradition of formal strategic reasoning in political philosophy-from the proto-game theory in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's description of the Stag Hunt (Rousseau, 1755) and David Hume's account of the Coordination Game (Hume, 1738-40) , to John Rawls' and David Gauthier's use of then-nascent game theory explicitly or implicitly in their justi catory methods (Rawls, 1971; Gauthier, 1986 )-has long been met with confusion as well as excitement. 18 This problem is also not new for applied economists, who are criticized ad nauseam for their reliance on models that stand in ambiguous relation to reality. 19 We take this feature of our methodology to be simultaneously perilous and promising. Connecting mechanism design more explicitly with political philosophy can help guide the powerful theoretical apparatus presented here into its most socially valued uses. At the same time, the introduction of complex justi catory tools that only a few experts can understand has its hazards. Indeed, as one of us has argued elsewhere that taking the theoretical justi cations common in mechanism design too literally can present major hazards in the design of social justice-oriented institutions (Hitzig, 2018) . For this reason, LR as a proposal and a political philosophy are both best seen as templates that require further re nement through collaboration between mathematically-oriented social scientists, conceptually rigorous philosophers, and practically oriented policymakers and entrepreneurs.
We believe LR is a powerful mechanism, but demands collaboration between (to quote Keynes again) those who "understand symbols" and those who "speak in words," in order to enable designers of our institutions to "contemplate the particular in terms of the general and touch abstract and concrete in the same ight of thought." It is precisely to help stimulate this collaboration that we wrote this paper in the multi-vocal way we warned of in our introduction. We identify particularly promising forms of collaboration, as well as further obstacles and limitations of the proposals, in the conclusion which follows. §8 Conclusion
The title of this paper and the name of our mechanism is at least a quintuple entendre. First, literally, it describes the mechanism, which uses the radical (viz. square root) to create a liberal funding regime for collective goods. Second, as we described in §7 above, our vision here is closely related to that of the Radical liberal tradition and thus it is a direct historical-ideological reference. Third, it is radical in the current common usage sense that it would fundamentally change the institutions of existing capitalism and one-person-one-vote if it were implemented.
Yet, most importantly, it is a radical form of liberalism in two senses with deep resonance in the history of political thought. As we saw in the previous section, there has long been a tradition of "radical political thought", much of it in the communitarian or continental tradition, that critiques traditional liberalism for ignoring the fundamentally social nature of human life. To a large extent, liberals have ignored or elided such critiques and championed super cially liberal institutions like capitalism or 1p1v democracy that sound neutral and anti-authoritarian but whose e fects can be quite opposite in the world we actually live in, where many of these "radical" critiques hold. In such a world, such systems typically lead to monopolies and the tyranny of majority groups.
Liberal Radicalism at its core is an attempt to take seriously these critiques and build a form of liberalism that seeks to achieve liberal ends in a fundamentally social world. In this sense it is also "radical" in the original meaning: it gets to the roots of what liberalism is about, in our account, namely an antiauthoritarian commitment to neutrality across ways of living and valuing. It thus eschews super cially liberal institutions that do not, given evident force of the radical critiques, achieve liberal goals. Further, it enables a vision of a di ferent social organization that plays out the fundamental ideas of liberalism much more completely.
It is this last aspect that strikes us as the most exciting direction in the long-term for our ideas here. So much of the liberal order at present is a rigid set of kludges designed to balance competing levels of social organization in roughly the way that Liberal Radicalism aims to, but without nearly the uidity the Liberal Radical mechanism o fers. Usually these attempts succeed for a period, but in the medium-term end up themselves becoming authoritarian impediments to change. Consider:
1. The modern nation state was largely an outgrowth of liberal movements demanding some form of self-determination, but ended up idolizing an organic vision of nationality that has become one of the greatest enemies of liberalism.
2. Liberal governmental structures aimed at protecting minorities, from the byzantine checks and balances of the American constitution to the bizarre religiously-apportioned power-sharing arrangements in Lebanon, have to a surprising degree succeeded in keeping the peace, but have deeply entrenched historical divisions by hard-coding them.
3. Geographical hierarchies of government (local, state, provincial, etc.) have been a powerful tool for liberals to decentralize power, yet have themselves become oddly outdated and rigid structures in a world where collaboration is often organized by social networks, trade ows and cultural communities rather than by physical space.
The greatest hope we hold out for Liberal Radicalism in the long-term is that it o fers an alternative to this awkward dance of capitalist atomization coupled with overlapping checks and balances among various rigid levels of collective organization. By allowing and optimally encouraging existing communities to act together, it preserves the crucial role of collective action. Yet by avoiding any xed role for any predetermined organization, it allows uid change and reformation of di ferent social groupings as societies evolve.
However, before it can hope to achieve such a lofty vision, far more thought, communication, experimentation, and organization will be necessary. We brie y conclude with some things we hope to see along each of these dimensions in the coming years.
In the category of ideas and research, our treatment of the economic theory around the LR mechanism was extremely super cial: its analysis is based on simpli ed assumptions of complete information; there is signi cant room for improvement in the analysis of the nancing mechanism and de cits' in uence on incentives; our discussion of collusion is super cial and our results on how to deter it are thin. Moreover, we do not even touch distributive issues. More ambitiously, the vision we sketched about the relationship of the Henry George Theorem to the possibility of funding LR through e ciency-enhancing taxes on decreasing returns activities is still very vague and should be examined in much greater detail.
Beyond economic theory, there are countless philosophical, sociological, design and political questions our discussion leaves open. How can LR re ect and respond to the feminist critique of capitalist individualism and family hierarchy? How would LR change social attitudes, interactions and ethical standards? What can be done to further defend it from attacks and hacks? What would political parties and activist organization look like under LR? More broadly, would LR optimally encourage community formation or would the norms and rules needed to avoid collusion inadvertently undermine important communities? Is it possible to make wide publics largely unfamiliar with mathematics comfortable with the LR mechanism?
It is on this last point where the input of artists, communicators and designers will be most important. LR is in some ways resonant with a wide range of familiar themes in the history of liberal politics. Yet its formal structure and speci c form will initially strike many as bizarre. Designing interfaces, helping the public to "see" what a LR society might be like, educating citizens about how to e fectively interact with it, educating philanthropists about its uses and more will be critical to making it a pervasive part of the consciousness of the public. Visual artists, game designers, journalists, lmmakers, science ction authors and more have already started to play a critical role in this communication for other Radical Markets ideas (Posner and Weyl, 2018) and we expect that the ambition and novelty of the LR mechanism will inspire more activity in this direction than any of the other, narrower ideas.
Building awareness and understanding of the ideas will, in turn, be a critical basis for and component of activism and organizing aimed at policy change in the LR direction. A number of present political alignments seem promising for coalescing social forces around these and related ideas. As liberals seek to stave o f the challenge of reactionary populist movements of the left and right, existing ideas seem increasingly stale and there is growing dissatisfaction with the atomizing character of standard liberal capitalism.
The social liberal tradition in Europe-exempli ed by a variety of parties within the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, and especially the Scandinavian member parties and European Commissioner for Competition Margarethe Vestager who hails from Denmark's Radikale Venstre party-have a particularly strong historical resonance with the ideas we develop here. Increasingly, these parties are becoming the central alternative to the rise of populism. Yet similar issues have come to the fore in the United States and Latin America, as liberal leaders confront the dual threats of ethnonationalism and state socialism at home while seeking to articulate an alternative to the avowedly illiberal world-views espoused by increasingly authoritarian governments in China and Russia. Without a coherent response, many fear that the next economic or international disruption could easily bring illiberal ideologies the success they just missed in the 1930s and 1940s.
Yet while a global scale political response to the present crisis is much of what motivates us, we do not expect it to be the rst realm in which the LR will nd application. Instead, we have laid out a variety of narrower domains in which we anticipate experimentation in the near term. Such experimentation is critical for a variety of reasons: to investigate the weaknesses of the formal mechanisms and address these aws with new designs, to acquaint people with their operation and build awareness of their value, to build social institutions around them that make them e fective, and to provide rigorous empirical evidence of their value.
We expect and hope for a wide range of such experimentation around LR. The most likely rst application will be open source software communities, which are very open to experiments with new algorithms, especially ones that change social dynamics; cryptocurrency communities seem particularly ap-propriate. However, we are also hopeful that a variety of philanthropists, especially those that made their money in the technology world, will seek to use such mechanisms to fund a wide range of activities currently covered by charities. The Open Philanthropy and "e fective altruism" movements are based on the idea that donor discretion should be removed to the extent possible from philanthropy. In areas where randomized controlled trials and other precise measurements are insu cient to direct funds, LR seems well-suited to this philosophy.
